Feminist Legal Academics: Changing the Epistemology of American Law through Conflicts, Controversies and Comparisons by Menkel-Meadow, Carrie





     Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2017-18 
 
Feminist Legal Academics: Changing the Epistemology of 
American Law Through Conflicts, Controversies 
and Comparisons 
(Chapter IN: Gender and Careers in the Legal Academy, Ulrike Schultz, editor, Hart 
Publishing-Onati Series, forthcoming) 
 
      Carrie Menkel-Meadow  
     cmeadow@law.uci.edu   
  
University of California, Irvine ~ School of Law 









The paper can be downloaded free of charge from SSRN at: 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954126
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954126 
 1 
Feminist Legal Academics: Changing the Epistemology of American 




(to be published in Gender and Careers in the Legal Academy,  




I. Introduction: Generations of Women Law Professors Making New Legal Memes 
 
There are many ways that the story of women’s entrance to the American law 
professoriate can be told. It is important to note the numbers of first women at 
various stages of legal history, years of first entry,  first tenured  professors, first 
deans and administrators,2 and other important demographic milestones.3 It is 
                                                        
1 Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine 
and A.B. Chettle Jr. Professor of Law, Dispute Resolution and Conflict Resolution, 
Emerita, Georgetown University.  
Thanks to Ulrike Schultz and the other participants at the 2016 Conference on 
Gender and Careers in the Legal Academy Conference in Oberwesel, Germany for 
stimulating conversation, papers, comments, feedback and extraordinary feminist 
scholarship and company. Thanks to my colleagues Kaaryn Gustafson, Dan Burk, 
Jennifer Chacon and Michele Goodwin for comments, bibliographic, and substantive 
updates on newer generations in this work. And thanks to my research assistant, of 
the newest generation, Christine Fan, for comments, edits and reference checking.  I 
also thank Georgetown University Law Center and UCLA School of Law, which were 
the supportive crucibles, with so many wonderful feminist colleagues, of my own 
feminist work as a second-generation feminist legal academic. And to my husband, 
Robert Meadow, who is the most amazing feminist I know (and who is not a lawyer, 
though a former academic himself!). 
2 Herma Kay, ‘Women Law School Deans: A Different Breed or Just One of the Boys?’ 
(2002) 14 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 219. 
3 Herma Kay, “What I Learned About Feminism From the Early Women Law 
Professors,’ 9 Issues in Legal Scholarship 2 (2011); Herma Kay, The First Few and 
Those Who Followed: Women Law Professors in the United States During the 
Twentieth Century (forthcoming); Herma Kay, ‘The Future of Women Law 
Professors,’ (1991) 77 Iowa Law Review 5; Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Women in Law, 
Ch. 12 (New York: Basic Books, 1981); Donna Fossum “Law Professors: A Profile of 
the Teaching Branch of the Profession,’ 1980 American Bar Foundation Research 
Journal 501; D. Kelly Weisberg, (1979) ‘Women in Law School Teaching: Problems 
and Progress, 30 Journal of Legal Education 229; Marina Angel, “Women in Legal 
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important to describe and account for the location of women law professors in the 
much stratified profession of law teaching in the United States,4 from “doctrinal” 
research producing full professors to clinical professors, lawyering skills (legal 
writing) professors, adjuncts and academic counselors and administrators.5 It is 
                                                        
Education,” (2012) 80 University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 711; Ann 
McGinley, ‘Reproducing Gender on Law Faculties,’ (2009) Brigham Young University 
Law Review  99; Nancy Levit, ‘Keeping Feminism in Its Place: Sex Segregation and 
the Domestication of Female Academics,’ (2001), 49 University of Kansas Law  
Review 775; Meera Deo, ‘Looking Forward to Diversity in Legal Academia,’ (2014), 
29 Berkeley Journal of Gender Law and Justice 352. For a more conservative and 
male-oriented history of the American legal professoriate see Stephen B. Presser, 
Law Professors: Three Centuries of Shaping American Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West 
Publishing Co. 2017). 
4 Herma Kay’s important work, ibid, focuses exclusively on women law professors, 
beginning with Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong (1919, Berkeley), who were 
appointed to tenure track positions at the American Bar Association/Association of 
American Law Schools formally recognized schools, without paying much attention 
to the early women practitioners who educated other women in the late 1880s and 
early 1890s, either in law office settings (where many men were still learning their 
trade) or in unaccredited schools. Notably, two women founded a law school just for 
women (Washington College of Law-now American University College of Law- in 
Washington DC in 1898), fueling a debate about whether lawyers (like doctors) 
should learn law separately from men or not.  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The 
Feminization of the Legal Profession: The Comparative Sociology of Women in the 
Legal Profession,’ in R. Abel and P. Lewis, (eds.) Lawyers and Society Vol. III 
Comparative Theories (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989); Karen Berger 
Morello, The Invisible Bar: The Woman Lawyer in America: 1638 to the Present 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1986); Virginia G. Drachman, Sisters in Law: Women Lawyers 
in Modern American History (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998); 
Virginia G. Drachman, Women Lawyers and the Origins of Professional Identity in 
America (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press 1993); see also Regina Markell 
Morantz-Sanchez, Sympathy and Science: Women Physicians in American Medicine 
(New York: Oxford University Press 1985); Penina Migdal Glazer and Miriam Silver, 
Unequal Colleagues: The Entrance of Women into the Professions (New Brunswick, 
New Jersey: Rutgers University Press 1987).  In fact, many of the first women 
teaching law did so from practice or in non-professorial capacities so statistics on 
the first women law teachers are difficult to compute and different from the first 
women who were formally recognized as “legal academics” when more 
conventional or elitist standards are used as the measure. 
5 See Marina Angel, “Women Lawyers of All Colors Steered to Contingent Positions 
in Law Schools and Law Firms,” (2006), 26 UCLA Chicano/a Latino/a Law Review 
169; Marina Angel, “The Class Ceiling for Women in Legal Education: Contract 
Positions and the Death of Tenure,” (2000) 50 Journal of Legal Education 1. 
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instructive to compare women law professors with women’s entrance into other 
professional and academic fields (medicine, science,6 literature, social science, etc.). 
I leave these topics for others to pursue. Our standard story is one of growing 
numbers, continued stratification, but also increased diversification (race, ethnicity, 
if not class and political affiliation7) and now multiple generations of women law 
professors contributing to a vastly transformed understanding of what it means to 
study, research,  define, interpret and teach legal concepts (and practice them) in 
American  (post-graduate/professional certification) legal education.8 
 In this Chapter I will describe the inter-generational contributions of the first 
few decades of women law professors who have created a contested “canon” of new 
understandings of legal concepts in American jurisprudence and legal practice.9  I 
describe here the way in which several generations of women law professors (some 
                                                        
6 See recent obituary of the first woman tenured professor at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology,  Mildred Dresselhaus, The Queen of Carbon Dies at 86, 
Natalie Angier, New York Times, February 23, 2017. 
7 American Bar Association,  Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 
ABA Approved Law School Staff and Faculty Members, Gender & Ethnicity, Fall 2013, 
available at 
http://www,americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html.;  
James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity: Law Faculties in 1997 and 2013 (2015) 
(Northwestern Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 15-07, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=25816575; Richard Chused, ‘The Hiring and Retention of 
Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties,’ (1988) 137 U. Penn. Law 
Review 537; Deborah Jones Merritt and Barbara F. Reskin, ‘Sex, Race and 
Credentials: The Truth about Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring,’ (1997) 97 
Columbia Law Review 199. 
8 The American Association of Law Schools Section on Women in Legal Education is 
currently completing a project of oral histories of several generations of women law 
professors, starting with Chairs of the Section since its founding, and law professors 
who have led theory development, course instruction and leading litigation 
strategies and cases. 
9 As evidence of this considerable canon of work, it is essential to consult two of the 
first great compilations of feminist legal theory and writing about the law: F.C. De 
Coste, K.M. Munro and Lillian MacPherson, Feminist Legal Literature: A Selective 
Annotated Bibliography  (New York: Garland Publishing 1991) and Betty Taylor, 
Sharon Rush and Robert J. Munro, Feminist Jurisprudence, Women and the Law, 
Critical Essays, Research Agenda and Bibliography (Littleton, Colorado: Rothman & 
Co. 1999). 
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working with legal practitioners) have forged new legal ideas or “memes” (cultural 
units of understandings10), and legal causes of action that have reframed not only 
“women’s issues” (reproductive rights, employment and labor rights, family law, 
violence, rape and criminal law, as well as constitutional jurisprudence and  
different conceptions of “equality”), but have also contributed new conceptions or 
interpretations of mainstream legal concepts (e.g.  in contracts, property, and torts 
etc.11 ).  
 Those of us who have written about these developments over the years all 
acknowledge the inter-generational differences in meanings attributed to our goals 
as participants in the making of new legal epistemology12—the interpretation of law 
                                                        
10Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1976) Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
  A “meme”  (the concept derived from evolutionary biology and “gene”, as a unit of 
transmission of genetic material) is now described and used in cultural terms to 
mark an “idea, concept, behavior, style, or practice” (now even picture, symbol, logo 
or internet phrase) that is transmitted within a culture to describe phenomena in a 
compressed and influential sphere of influence. “Memes” are now also applied to 
intellectual ideas and concepts, not only in the sciences, but also in all spheres of 
learning, including law, as scholars hope to “create” significant new ideas and then 
track their influence in creating new knowledge, as well as mapping their influence, 
transformation, acceptance or rejection. I use the term here to describe exactly what 
the first generation of legal feminist theorists and academics did to law study and 
practice, in creating new legal theories, new causes of action, new forms of legal 
education and method, and contested categories of meaning and interpretation in 
law. The study of “memes” has become part of a larger field of study of human 
creativity, see e.g. Mihalyi Csikszenmihalyi, Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of 
Discovery and Invention (New York: Harper Collins 1996); Howard Gardner, Creating 
Minds: An Anatomy of Creativity (New York: Basic Books 1993; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, “Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal 
Education?” (2001) 6 Harv. Neg. L. Rev. 97-144.   
11 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory,’  (1992) 23 
Pacific Law Journal 1493. 
12 Carrie Menkel-Meadow,  ‘Women’s Ways of Knowing Law: Feminist Legal 
Epistemology, Pedagogy and Jurisprudence,’ in N.R. Goldberger, J.M. Tarule, B.M. 
Clinchy & M.F. Belenky (eds.) Knowledge, Difference and Power: Essays Inspired by 
Women’s Ways of Knowing (New York, Basic Books, 1996); Martha Chamallas, 
Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory (3rd ed., New York, Aspen Law and Business, 
2013); Cynthia Grant Bowman and Elizabeth M. Schneider, ‘Feminist Legal Theory, 
Feminist Lawmaking and the Legal Profession,’  (1998) 67 Fordham Law Review 
249; Patricia Cain, ‘Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories,  (1989-90) 4 
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and doctrine, the creation of new concepts, causes of actions, or  legal “memes,” the 
creation of new courses and methods for learning law,13 whether and how our new 
epistemology should be integrated (or more controversially “assimilated”) into 
mainstream American law doctrine and education,14 how we have or have not 
influenced the legal academy and legal thought generally,  as well as legal practice 
and law reform measures, and what lessons we offer for future generations of 
“outsiders” who are increasingly populating our profession with more diverse 
bodies and ideas.  
 It is common to speak of at least four stages of modern American legal 
feminism as theories in the development of different conceptions of women’s issues 
with and in the law. The first generation, now called “equality” feminism, focused on 
seeing the equivalence of men and women as human beings entitled to many “equal” 
rights, including entrance into the Bar itself15 (and later, the professoriate). Early 
entrants to both the bar and the professoriate concentrated on seeing women and 
men as entitled to the same legal rights, and both litigated and educated to achieve 
as much gender parity as possible in the  doctrine of law itself,16 in law school 
classrooms, and in the practice of law. Our most distinguished first explicitly self-
identifying feminist law professors, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Herma Kay, Barbara 
                                                        
Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 191; Katherine T, Bartlett (1990) “Feminist Legal 
Methods,” 103 Harvard Law Review 829. 
13 Katherine Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods, (1990), 103 Harvard Law Review 
829; Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Shari Seidman Diamond,  (1991)‘The Content, 
Method and Epistemology of Gender in Socio-Legal Studies,’ 25 Law & Society 
Review 221. 
14 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory,’  (1992) 23 Pacific 
Law Journal 1493. 
15 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1872).  Barbara Babcock, Woman 
Lawyer: The Trials of Clara Foltz  (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011). 
16 In the early years of the equality movement, much attention was spent on 
changing male pronouns and language in statutes to either more inclusive or neutral 
pronouns (s/he, they, he or she), a movement calling for “gender neutrality” in the 
law. This was uncontroversial in some subject areas, but much more controversial 
in others (definitions of rape, pregnancy and reproductive rights, etc.) and began to 
expose the difficulty of assuming true existential “equality” or equivalence where 
trying to achieve legal substantive equality (sometimes requiring “different” or 
“special” treatment, see below). 
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Babcock, Wendy Williams, Nadine Taub, Rhonda Copelon and others (in the late 
1960s and 1970s) began work on the first women’s rights and sex discrimination 
casebooks, development of legal strategies for claims and assertion of “equal rights” 
in legislatures and courts, and courses that focused on women’s issues in the law 
(employment, reproductive rights, criminal law, domestic relations and an 
assortment of laws that either ignored women or excluded them from legal rights 
and responsibilities that men had.17) 
 The second generation (of which I am a part), often educated in the exciting 
and turbulent years of the growth of the “second wave” of feminism in the larger 
American political and social culture18 and the development of “women’s studies” as 
an academic field,19 later became known as “difference” or “cultural” feminism, 
because of its focus on the differences, rather than the similarities, between men 
and women (including the treatment of pregnancy and child-leave legal issues) and 
the controversial valorization of “women’s particular values” (to be brought to law, 
culture, and other institutional  aspects of organizational and social life).  
 As more fully outlined below, in a series of important legal issues and cases, 
these generations and the issues they represented engaged in a variety of creative 
conflicts about how many legal issues should be treated (prostitution,20 
                                                        
17 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Elizabeth Schneider, ‘The Dialectics of Rights 
and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement,’  (1986) 61 NYU Law 
Review 589. 
18 Betty Freidan, Feminine Mystique, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963); Gloria 
Steinem, Outrageous Acts and Everyday Rebellions,  (New York: New American 
Library, 1983); Germaine Greer, The Female Eunuch (New York: Harper Collins 
1970);  Kate Millett, Sexual Politics , ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); 
Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract ( Stanford University Press, 1988); Sara Evans, 
Personal Politics: The Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and 
the New Left (1980) (chronicling “second wave” feminism). 
19 Margaret Anderson, Thinking About Women: Sociological Perspectives on Sex and 
Gender  (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1993); Suzanne Kessler and Wendy 
McKenna, Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press (1978); Beth B. Hess and Myra Marx Ferree, Analyzing Gender: A Handbook of 
Social Science Research (Newbery Park, Calif., Sage Publications,  (1987); Carol 
Tavris, The Mismeasure of Women (New York: Simon & Schuster: 1992). 
20 See e.g. Deborah Rhode, Justice and Gender (1989) pp. 253-257; Dorchen 
Leidholdt, ‘Prostitution: A Violation of Women’s Human Rights,’ (1993) 1 Cardozo 
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pornography,21 rape, 22 pregnancy,23 and employment24), resulting in some 
fractures and breaks in theory, ideology and practice.25 As I review more fully 
below, some of these complex controversies and debates recapitulated, for those of 
us who knew women’s history, the divisions in the nineteenth century women’s 
suffrage movement in the United States (which divided over anti-slavery abolitionist 
and “women’s” rights).26  If women were different from men in some ways (both 
physical/biological and socialized behaviors), how the law should treat these 
differences was very complicated. And this generation also began to observe, though 
comparative law and social practice study, that different legal systems treated such 
differences differently (e.g. pregnancy and child care and employment policies in 
Europe). 27 
                                                        
Women’s Law Journal 133;  Amy Cohen & Aya Gruber, ‘Governance Feminism in 
New York’s Alternative “Human Trafficking Intervention Courts,” in Governance 
Feminism: A Handbook (Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswarn, Rachel Rebouche & Hila 
Shamir, eds, University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming). 
21 Catherine MacKinnon,  ‘Not a Moral Issue,’ in Feminism Unmodified (Harvard 
University Press, 1987); Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women 
(1989);  American Booksellers v. Hudnut (771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir 1985), aff’d 106 Sup. 
Ct. 1172 (1986) 
22 Frances Olsen, ‘Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis in Feminist 
Legal Theory,’ (1984) 63 Texas Law Review 387. 
23 Sylvia Law, ‘Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,’ (1984) 132 U. Penn. Law 
Review 955. 
24 See conflicts  over women’s employment in the case of EEOC v. Sears, 628 F. Supp 
1264 (N. D. Ill. 1986), affirmed 839 F. 2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988) and protective labor 
legislation, discussed more fully in the text and in Richard Chused and Wendy 
Williams, Gendered Law in American History (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina 
Press, 2016), chapters 9 and 10. 
25 For representative articles and cases of this period see Frances Olsen (ed.) 
Feminist Legal Theory, Vols. I and II (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995);  Katherine 
Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy (eds.) , Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and 
Gender (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press (1991);  Elizabeth Schneider & 
Stephanie Wildman,  Women and the Law Stories (New York: Foundation Press 
2011). 
26 Ellen Dubois, Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Woman’s 
Movement in America 1848-1869 (1978)  (now called “first wave feminism in 
American history); Ibid, Chused and Williams, chapters 1 and 8. 
27 Barbara Bergmann, Saving Children from Poverty: What the United States Could 
Learn from France (1996). 
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 Differences themselves were highly contested by feminist law professors and 
theorists as feminist theorist and activist Catherine MacKinnon focused on an 
explanatory sexual  “dominance” by men approach28 and others attributed 
“difference” to women’s childbearing potential or more socialized “caring” 
natures.29 Although present (and latent in some ways) in the first generation, the 
claim by lesbian feminist law professors30 that first generation feminism assumed 
heterosexuality in its theory and practice, began to sow the seeds of complexity of 
identity, as an  assumed “essentialism”  of “womanhood” (resulting in more 
divisions in legal theory development and practice.) 
 Second generation feminism also produced more explicit courses in law 
schools on “women’s rights/ gender discrimination,31 feminist legal theory, 
women’s legal clinics (e.g. domestic violence, 32 employment discrimination,33 etc.) 
                                                        
28 Catherine Mackinnon, ‘Difference and Dominance,’ in Feminism Unmodified, 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987); Catherine MacKinnon, ‘ 
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law,’ (1991) 100 Yale L. J. 1281.. 
29 Robin West, ‘ Jurisprudence and Gender,’ (1988)  55 University Of Chicago Law 
Review 1; Id. Caring For Justice (New York: NYU Press, 1997) ; Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, ‘Portia in a Different Voice:  Speculations on A Women’s Lawyering 
Process, ‘  (1985) 1 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 39; Martha Fineman, ‘Challenging 
Law: Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Scholarship,  (1990), 42 
Florida Law Review 25. 
30 Rhonda R. Rivera, ‘Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual 
Persons in the United States,’ (1978) 30 Hastings L.J. 799; Patricia Cain, Rainbow 
Rights, The Role of Lawyers and Courts in the Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights Movement 
(2000); Nan Hunter, ‘Sexuality and Civil Rights: Re-Imagining Anti-Discrimination 
Laws, (2000) 17 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 565-587.  
31 Uses of the words “sex” discrimination, “gender”  discrimination and “feminist” or 
“gender studies and  theory” roiled some of the early years of academic theory 
development and teaching in the field. None of these terms were conceptually 
“neutral.” Whether to problematize “sex” as a biological or socialized category and 
whether to include men and masculinity studies as a more expanded “gender 
discrimination” concern became significant in theory building and litigation 
strategies., Ann  C. McGinley and Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities and the Law 
(New York: NYU Press, 2012).  
32 Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 2002). 
33 Laura Sager’s  Civil Litigation Employment Discrimination clinic  at NYU is 
decades old. 
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and more participatory and experiential methods of teaching (drawing from the 
women’s liberation movement method of “consciousness raising”34). 
 A deep challenge to legal feminism came (as it did to feminism in the United 
States generally), from women of color, various ethnic, racial, religious and “non-
white” women, and also women from working classes who argued in a variety of 
venues that American legal feminism was “essentialist,” middle class, and “white.”35 
With the increased (though still highly marginalized) representation of more 
diverse women in the legal professoriate, theorists and activists Angela Harris,  
Patricia Williams, Kimberle Crenshaw, Mari Matsuda, and others36 interrogated the 
assumptions of an “essential” feminist theory and called for both new 
conceptualizations (e.g. “intersectionality”37) and new legal claims in a wide variety 
of legal subjects (e.g., criminal, family, discrimination and employment law). As 
more fully canvassed below, these law professors were often identified with other 
legal movements (e.g., critical legal studies, 38 critical race theory,39 lat-crit 
                                                        
34 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Women's Ways of "Knowing" Law: Feminist Legal 
Epistemology, Pedagogy, and Jurisprudence, in Knowledge, Difference and Power 
(Bilenky, Clinchy, Goldberger & Tarule, editors) New York: Basic Books, 1996. 
35 Angela Harris, ‘Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,’ (1990) 42 
Stanford Law Review 581; Elizabeth Spelman, Inessential Woman (1988); bell hooks, 
‘Essentialism and Experience,’ (1991) 3 American Literary History 172;  Gloria T. 
Hull, All the Women Are White, All the Blacks are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave 
(Feminist Press:  1982); Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of 
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics (1989),  University of Chicago Forum ; C. Moraga & G. 
Anzaldua, (eds)  This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color (2nd 
ed. 1983). 
36 Mari Matsuda, Where is Your Body? (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1996); Patricia 
Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press,1991). 
37 Kimberle Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity, Politics and 
Violence Against Women of Color,’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241. 
38 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies and Legal 
Education, or the “Fem-Crits” Go to Law School,’  (1988) 38 Journal of Legal 
Education 61 
39 Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller and Kendall Thomas, (eds.) Critical 
Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement (1995).; Adrienne Wing,  
Critical Race Feminism: A Reader, 2nd ed. (2007). 
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theory40), which provoked a turn to “identity” in legal theory and practice.41 
Whether called “multi-cultural feminism”42 or diversity feminism, the contributions 
of a far more diverse professoriate expanded legal ideas, legal claims and a variety 
of new courses and programs in American legal education.43 Within this context a 
series of  claims and arguments were made that gender (sociological) or sex 
(biological) could and did have different effects when added to other  biological, 
socially constructed, or identity characteristics, sometimes called “sex plus” theories 
and practices. 
 Another major challenge disrupted the development of the ideas of modern 
legal feminism, when fueled by “identity” politics, “queer theory,”44 and concerns 
about “essentialism,” when linked to the “post-modern” turn in academic theory 
generally. Now called “post-modern feminism”,45 borrowing from theories of post-
modernism in literary and philosophical scholarship more generally, these theories 
challenge conventional categories of law, knowledge and epistemology generally. At 
least one post-modern feminist (and gender and trans-gender theorist) has called 
                                                        
40 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanicic, The Latino/a Condition: A Critical Reader 
(2nded. 2010); Margaret Montoya, ‘Mascaras, Trenzas, Y Grenas: Un/Masking the 
Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse,’ (1994), 17 Harvard 
Women’s Law Journal 185 (1994). 
41 Devon Carbado and MItu Gulati, Acting White: Rethinking Race in Post-Racial 
America (Oxford Univ Press 2013); Ian Haney Lopez, White By Law (New York: NYU 
Press, 1996). 
42 Ellen Dubois and Vicki Ruiz, (eds.)  Unequal Sisters: An Inclusive Reader in U.S. 
Women’s History (New York: Routledge, 4th ed. 2007). 
43 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession 
Making New Voices in the Law,’ (1987) 42 University of Miami Law Review 29 
(1987). 
44 Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson and Adam Romero, Feminist and Queer 
Legal Theory: Intimate Encounters, Uncomfortable Conversations (Farnham: UK; 
Ashgate, 2009).  
45 Mary Jo Frug, Postmodern Feminism (New York: Routledge, 1992); Judith Butler. 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge 
1990);  Ann Scales, ‘Post-structuralism on Trial,” in Fineman, ibid, note 44. 
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for a “break” from feminism46 and a rethinking of all categories that are reified in 
law and gender difference. 
 In the rest of this chapter I will elaborate on how the increased numbers and 
diversification of the American legal professoriate to include women, of many races, 
cultures, ethnicities and classes, has altered, contributed to and challenged 
traditional legal ideas or “memes”, including challenges to legal concepts, legal 
practice and also to legal education. As I am a participant-observer in these 
processes, it is important to remember that this narrative is likely contested by 
others who have also contributed to or studied these processes, and also to see a 
parallel and more conventional story that simply recounts the addition of more 
women professors, many of whom seek a more simple assimilation to the law 
professoriate, as doctrinal or clinical or lawyering skills professors, in a wide variety 
of subjects which, to them, are not necessarily affected by or influenced by feminist 
theoretical concerns. I will argue here, however, that whatever their sources, an 
important number of ideas and methods have indeed been “mainstreamed” from 
feminist legal thought into American law and legal education. 
 
II. The First Generation: Equality 
Women began trickling into the legal academy one by one in the early to mid-
twentieth century, after the first few women lawyers had won their battles to study 
law, either as apprentices to relatives or other progressive men, and state by state to 
gain licensure. In the United States legal education had been primarily a private, 
apprenticeship process until well into the latter half of the nineteenth century, when 
men could enter the profession either through apprenticeship or law study. The 
early part of the twentieth century in American legal education was characterized 
by several controversial projects to “professionalize” law training by requiring some 
admissions standards, beginning to require college degrees before law study, and 
the installation of the famous “Langdellian method” of inductive study of cases in a 
                                                        
46 Jane Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (2006); 
writing also as Ian Halley, see ‘Queer Theory by Men,’ in Fineman, Ibid, note  44. 
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law school to derive common law principles.47 There continued to be a bifurcation 
of law study in law offices and law schools, and also between private proprietary 
for-profit schools and university law schools for decades before women finally were 
admitted to formal law study.  
 Unlike in medicine, although a few law schools attempted to be for “women 
only” (Portia Law School in Boston and Washington College of Law in the District of 
Columbia in the late 19th century), a few law schools began to admit women, 
alongside men, in the early 20th century, but with a few exceptions  (University of 
Michigan48) most of the elite schools (Ivy League) in the United States did not admit 
women until mid-century. Harvard, one of the latest  to admit women (in 1950), 
hired, in  1947, its first women law professor, the brilliant Soia Mentschikoff49 (born 
in Russia, but educated in the United States, and later married to one of the most 
distinguished American law professors, Karl Llewellyn (drafter of  the Uniform 
Commercial Code) before women law students were admitted. If anyone exemplifies 
this first generation it was Dean Mentschikoff—brilliant as a legal practitioner, 
academic, teacher and scholar and an expert in traditionally male fields—
commercial and labor law and Socratic legal method. Though she served as a role 
model to many women  in academe (notably former Dean (Berkeley) Herma Kay 
                                                        
 47 Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850’s to the 1980s 
(Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press,1983);  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Too 
Little Theory, Too Little Practice: Steven's Law School,’ 1985 Am. B. F. Res. J. 675-690. Tom 
C. Grey, ‘Langdell’s Orthodoxy,’ (1983) University of Pittsburg Law Review. 
48 See V. Drachman, note 4 . 
49 Soia Mentschikoff was a woman of many firsts. She was a first women partner in 
two Wall Street law firms after graduating from Columbia Law  School, she actually 
did some of the drafting of the UCC, and was the first woman Reporter for a 
Restatement of the Law for the American Law Institute; she was the first woman 
hired as a professor at the University of Chicago Law School (after her alma mater 
Columbia would not hire her) and she later became a Dean at the University of 
Miami and the first women President of the Association of American Law Schools. In 
my field, she was renowned for writing some of the first academic (and empirical) 
studies about commercial, labor and international arbitration and mediation. 
Decades of her students, male and female, extolled her teaching abilities, including 
mastery of the Langdellian (or Kingsfeldian, see  John Jay Osborn, The Paper Chase, 
1971) method of rigorous Socratic questioning of students to derive common law  
principles. 
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who studied at the University of Chicago when Mentschikoff was a professor there), 
her project was professionally traditionally legal –no feminist theory to speak or 
write of. 
 Others who followed shortly after her (such as Dean Kay) also excelled in 
traditional male subjects (conflicts of law, oil and gas law, business law, trusts and 
estates) but many also began, whether from choice or not, to take on some of the 
“women’s subjects”—family and domestic relations law--  and often proudly worked 
on law reform projects in those areas. 
 The first generation of women law professors also included a woman known 
to most readers of this essay, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, first at Rutgers University in 
New Jersey, then as the first tenured woman law professor at Columbia  (1972),50 
later second woman Justice on the United States Supreme Court (after serving for 
many years on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals). Justice Ginsburg, along 
with my former (now retired, Georgetown) colleague Wendy Webster Williams 
were architects of a litigation strategy that took many “gender” equality cases 
through the federal courts, as both of them served both as professors and as 
litigators (and occasionally as legislative draftspersons51) to articulate the legal 
policy that women were, in every relevant way, “equal” to men and deserving of all 
                                                        
50 In the 1970s as a young scholar (at the University of Pennsylvania law school) I 
was often asked to write reviews and letters of recommendations for Professor 
Ginsburg as several schools tried to hire her away from Columbia because they were 
interested in getting her husband (a distinguished tax practitioner and scholar, and 
later my colleague at Georgetown) to join them. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘A 
Special Kind of Equality: Remarks for the Acceptance of the Wendy Webster 
Williams Award for “Significant Contributions to Gender Equality Through Law” on 
behalf of Award Recipient The Honorable Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,’  (2000) 2  
Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 149. 
51 Professor Williams was largely responsible for drafting the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 (amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting 
discrimination in employment, after several cases held that pregnancy 
discrimination was not “sex” discrimination, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
Pregnancy was, after the new Act, to be treated “equally” to other “temporary 
disabilities” affecting work and benefits. 
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rights of legal equality. 52 In the litigation brought by Justice Ginsburg when she was 
the founding lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union’s Women’s Right Project, 
she often represented men to obtain recognition of “equal rights”  (e.g., for federal 
widow (widower) benefits53) of both genders to jobs, federal and state benefits (and 
“burdens” as well, including estate administration and taxation).  The commitment 
of this first generation was to “equality” tout court, men and women were equal in 
competence, ability to work, provide for families, to think and to engage in 
reproductive behavior. Therefore, all laws that treated the genders differently 
should be reversed and made to include both genders within their ambit.   
 This was the commitment to see “equality” as the basic idea in legal 
formation of laws, conceptions of human beings and legal duties and 
responsibilities. In the 1980s and 1990s a series of Task Forces, sponsored by 
national and state bar associations (e.g., American Bar Association on the 
Commission on Women54) and courts (many of the major American federal courts of 
appeals and some state systems), conducted extensive studies and issued many 
reports on such issues as underrepresentation of women in the judiciary, the 
treatment of women lawyers, witnesses, court employees and substantive legal 
issues, all  to be reformed in the name of equality and parity.55 
                                                        
52 Wendy W. Williams, “Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal 
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate,” (1984-85) 13 New York University Review of 
Law and Social Change 325. 
53 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
54 Chaired at one point by Hillary Rodham (Clinton). See also Commission on  
Women in the Profession, American Bar Association, Elusive Equality: The 
Experiences of Women in Leal Education (1996). 
55 See e.g., Judith Resnik , ‘Gender Bias: From Classes to Courts,’  (1993)  Yale 
Research Paper, commenting on Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force Report 
(Procter Hug, J.); Vicki Jackson, ‘What Judges Can Learn from Gender Bias Task 
Forces,’ (1997) 81 Judicature 15;  Report of the DC Circuit Gender Bias Task Force,  84 
Georgetown Law Journal  1651 (1996) ; See Elizabeth Schneider, Task Force Reports 
on Women in the Courts: The Challenge for Legal Education, 38 Journal of Legal 
Education 87 (1988); Barbara A. Babcock, ‘Introduction: Gender Bias in the Courts 
and Civic and Legal Education,’ (1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 2143.; see Bowman 
and Schneider, note 3.     
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 As this first generation focused on a litigation strategy of equality, using both 
“equal protection” Constitutional theories and a variety of statutory and other 
claims, a growing number of first law students, and then feminist law teachers, 
began to offer courses in “Women in the Law” or “Sex Discrimination ” to study all 
the categories of law in which the equality principle required legal revision   These 
courses were often taught with ad hoc prepared material (my own course first 
taught in 1973), but eventually with a series of new texts and casebooks on Sex 
Discrimination Law or Women’s Rights.56 In 1971, a male Yale Law professor joined 
with several of his students to provide the legal justification for a new Constitutional 
amendment, (the Equal Rights Amendment) to make “equality” of the genders a 
foundational principle.57 This was the second time in American history such an 
amendment was proposed. The original amendment proposed by Alice Paul58 in the 
early 20th century failed to gain appropriate approval, as women’s suffrage became 
the dominant issue and “other” women’s rights were treated as either secondary or 
interfering with the politics of suffrage.   
 Legal academics began writing articles to argue about what “equality” meant 
for parenting, criminal responsibility, protection from violence, property rights, 
employment, education, contracting, inheritance, tort liability and compensation 
and almost every area of law was questioned. Some argued for simple “search and 
                                                        
56 See e.g. ,  R. M. Davidson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Herma Hill Kay, Text, Cases and 
Materials on Sex-Based Discrimination (St. Paul: West Publications, 1974); Barbara A. 
Babcock, Ann Friedman, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Susan Deller Ross, Wendy 
Williams, Sex Discrimination and the Law: Causes and Remedies  (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1974). The first text in the field was actually written by a man (and was the 
one used in my own first course in Women and the law, see Leo Kanowitz, Women 
and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution (1969). Professor Kanowitz taught Women 
in the Law at the University of California, Hastings until the late 1970s when women 
professors took over the course. He devoted much of his distinguished career (as a 
labor expert, to classic equal rights advocacy (including the ERA) and to the 
elimination of all formal differences between men and women in the law. 
57 Barbara Brown, Thomas I. Emerson, Gail Falk,  Ann E. Freedman, (1971) ‘The 
Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, ‘ 80 
Yale Law Journal 871. 
58 J.D. Zahniser & Amelia Fry, Alice Paul: Claiming Power (New York: Oxford Univ 
Press, 2014). 
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replace” for every time “man” or “he” appeared in a law, with a substitution of 
“woman” or “she” or a search for neutral pronouns in laws.   
 These efforts spawned a new annual meeting, the “Women and the Law 
Conference”, beginning in 1969-70, as organized by a group of New York University  
Law students (among them Susan Deller Ross, who also was my colleague later on 
the Georgetown Law faculty),and traveling for several decades,(not every year) until 
1992, to cities on both United States coasts and in between, to bring together 
feminist activist lawyers, legal academics and students to meet, discuss and 
eventually argue about interpretations of law, legal strategies, cases to litigate and 
organize around, and how to advocate and teach about the different areas of law. 59 
 During this period a number of activist law professors and lawyers began to 
focus on particular areas of law requiring law reform to  ensure women’s equal 
participation in society. In addition to claims for increased participation and 
representation in the work force (at both professional and blue collar levels), 
activists created liability (criminal) for domestic violence,60 and civil liability for 
sexual harassment,61 changed definitions of rape and consent62 (including the first 
trials of husbands raping their own wives), demanded reproductive rights (not only 
access to contraception and abortion, but also changes in the treatment of 
pregnancy in the workplace) and reframed  many family law issues (custody 
preferences in the law), as well as litigating for a variety of equalizing “benefits” 
                                                        
59 Elizabeth Schneider, ‘Feminist Lawmaking and Historical Consciousness: Bringing 
the Past into the Future” (1994) 2 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and Law 1. 
60 Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women:  Feminist Law Making    (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002); Clare Dalton, Battered Women and the Law (Foundation 
Press, 2001); Elizabeth Schneider, Domestic Violence and the Law: Theory and 
Practice (Foundation Press 2007). 
61 Catherine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment and Working Women (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 1979); Nadine Taub, ‘Defining and Combatting Sexual Harassment,’ 
in Class, Race and Sex: The Dynamics of Control (Amy Swerdlow and Hannah 
Lessinger, eds., Boston: GK. W. Hall, 1983); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57 (1986). 
62 Susan Estrich, Real Rape : How the Legal System Victimizes Women Who Say No 
(Yale University Press 1987); Susan Estrich, ‘Rape” (1986) 95 Yale L. J. 1087. 
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under the law. 63 Despite the complaints of later generations that the first 
generation was “white and middle class”, the records (and my own experience) of 
these Women and the Law Conferences are full of workshops and materials on 
Women of Color, Disabled Women, Lesbian Women, Immigrant Women, the 
economics of the workforce, Single Mothers, and the rights of children.64  
 These meetings and the political struggles over the meaning of the Equal 
Rights Amendment (with a politically conservative movement founded by Phyllis 
Schlafly to oppose it,  65with concerns about uni-sex bathrooms, privacy, military 
service and child support)  began to  expose the differences within legal feminism:  
• how should pregnancy be treated under law (women got pregnant; 
men did not) 
• should prostitution be legalized (with women in control of their own 
bodies) 
• should pornography (harmful to women in fact and image) be 
regulated or banned in a country with a First Amendment guarantee 
of  free speech 
• was feminism only about marriage equality (what about lesbians or 
straight women who either couldn’t or didn’t want to be married) 
• where were the struggles of minority or working class women in the 
early cases of wage equality waged on behalf of the professional 
classes 
• did women need “special” or “protected” working conditions 
(especially when pregnant) 
                                                        
63  Accompanied by several  failures,  e.g..,  Kahn v. Shevin,  416 U.S. 351 (1974), 
retaining certain gender preferences in taxation, and Feeney v. Massachusetts,  442 
U.S. 256 (1979) preserving the “veteran’s preference”  in employment settings, 
despite its obvious sex disparate outcomes. 
64 See Schneider, note 59. 
65 Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA (University of Chicago Press, 1986) p 
110. The ERA received ratification by 35 states; it required 38 to become part of the 
United States Constitution. 
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• should women’s advocates fight hard in litigation to gain rights or was 
it acceptable to use other methods of organizing (legal vs. political) or 
dispute resolution (was mediation a “sell-out” process for women, 
encouraging compromise)? 
These fractures in the “equality” conception exposed that “substantive equality” 
might be reached in ways that demanded “special” or “different” treatment for 
women in some contexts (e.g. pregnancy leaves and benefits, as more common in 
Europe66).  Could gender “parity” be better achieved by acknowledging some 
“gendered” (biological/sociological) differences? 
 
III. The Second Generation – “Difference” (or Cultural) Feminism 
 In the 1980’s four issues split the feminist legal community into  several ideological 
and practical factions:  treatment of pregnancy under law,  employment  
discrimination litigation in the case of EEOC v. Sears, pornography (and its 
regulation or treatment as a compensable tort) and the rise of a theory of “women’s 
psychological (and or biological or sociological) differences” from men, made 
popular by psychologist Carol Gilligan,67 which could valorize and claim women’s 
differences,  from men. Social and legal justice might not depend entirely on the 
legal concept of “equality” in a traditional legal sense but needed to be taken account 
of in different and more complex ways. 
 In one of the first dramatic schisms of American legal feminism, two sets of 
law professors (and activist lawyers) divided over how pregnancy should be treated 
in American law. When pregnant women in several occupations were either fired 
during, or not returned to their jobs after, pregnancy they sued, in both private and 
public contexts, that such treatment was sex discrimination. Remarkably, the United 
States Supreme Court held, in both the public and private sectors, that different 
                                                        
66 California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
67 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1982); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Portia 
in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s Lawyering Process,’ 1 Berkeley 
Women’s Law Journal 31 (1985). 
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treatment of “pregnancy” (from other “temporarily” disabling conditions) was not 
sex discrimination, because although only women could become pregnant, the class 
of non-pregnant workers included both women and men.68 Law professor Wendy 
Webster Williams led a group of dedicated feminist activists to draft and then 
advocate for passage in the United States Congress, the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, which, when it eventually passed, required pregnancy to be treated  like other 
temporary disabilities.69  This became a victory for “equality” feminists as 
pregnancy was treated in employment like other short-term illnesses or absences 
from work for disabling (temporary) conditions.  
 Unfortunately for any desired theoretical uniformity, many states in the 
United States (mostly in the newer, western states) actually provided “special” 
benefits for pregnant workers, whether in formal recognition of the importance of 
reproduction (as many European countries gave bonuses, special leaves and other 
benefits to either mothers alone or eventually to all parents70) or as benefits for 
women to keep them in the workforce as needed (in 19th century labor shortages in 
the western states).  California, for example, provided for guaranteed four-month 
“pregnancy/maternity” leave and a guarantee of a job on return to work. This law 
was challenged as sex discrimination under Title VII of the United States Civil Rights 
law71 by both the conservative Reagan administration and the National 
Organization for Women (a feminist organization), for including gendered 
categories within formal law.  One group of professors (I was among those) wrote 
briefs and argued for sustaining the law, with the recognition that, at least with 
respect to pregnancy, women were indeed “different” from men and required 
“accommodation” (a term used from other legislation) or “special” treatment in 
                                                        
68 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,  429 U.S. 
125 (1976). 
69 42 U.S.C.  2000e-k (as amended by Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978). 
70 See Bergmann, ibid, note 27 and Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family 
and Work Conflict and What to Do About it (New York: Oxford Press 2001). 
71 42 U.S.C. 2000-e. 
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order to achieve substantive equality (the opportunity to participate fully in the 
workplace.)72  
 Another group of women law professors and activists argued, on the other 
side, for no formal recognition in the law of “gender-specific” differences.73 This 
group, fearing repetition of gender specific “protective” laws in the workplace 
(maximum hours, minimal wages and “safe” conditions of work), which had, in the 
19th century, limited women’s participation in the workforce, wanted to preserve 
total equality of conditions in the workplace.  
 Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court sustained the “special 
treatment” of pregnancy benefits, approvingly citing the brief written by law 
professor Christine Littleton (my colleague at the time at UCLA Law School).74 In 
1993 one of the first bills signed into law by President William Clinton was the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (allowing for unpaid leave of 12 weeks for anyone 
attending to the birth, illness or required family care of a relative, in employment 
sites of more than 50 employees75). Current advocacy (unlikely to succeed any time 
soon) seeks to convert such family leaves into paid leaves, as is common in much of 
the rest of the developed world. 
 The pregnancy leave, or CalFed issue as we called it then, was the legal 
embodiment of a continuing dilemma for legal feminists—when and for what 
purposes do biological (or sociological) differences of the genders justify different 
legal treatment? What began as a dispute with obvious biological differences 
(pregnancy) next emerged with respect to what were called “socially constructed” 
differences – did women have different “preferences” for the kinds of work they 
sought?  And if there were such differences were they “innate” to women or 
structured by discriminatory expectations of employers and the larger society? 
                                                        
72 Christine Littleton,  ‘Reconstructing Sexual Equality,’ (1987) 75 California Law 
Review 1279; Herma Kay, ‘Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy,’ (1985) 1 
Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 1. 
73 Williams, Ibid, note 52;  Law, Ibid. note 23 
74 California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
75 Family and Medical Leave Act,  29 U.S.C. 2601-2654 (West Supp. 1995, signed into 
law 1993). 
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 The case of EEOC v. Sears (1984) brought this issue to the fore, and once 
again, leading legal feminist academics, this time joined by conflicting sets of 
feminist historians, were on opposite sides of the case, with different underlying 
conceptions of what it means to be a woman and what constitutes gender 
discrimination. 76The  Equal Employment Opportunity  Commission (the 
administrative tribunal tasked with enforcing employment discrimination laws) 
brought a class action lawsuit against the nation’s largest (then) retailer, Sears 
Roebuck, with several claims of discrimination:  1) that women were denied 
employment in higher paying commission paid (not straight salary, but percentage 
of total sales, usually of appliances, cars and other “larger” priced items) jobs by not 
being hired for them in the first place or 2)by not being allowed to transfer to such 
jobs from lower paid salaried jobs and 3) lower wages for certain classes of work.  
Typically such cases were proven by two different theories – explicit disparate 
treatment or more complicated, disparate impact (the effects, demonstrated by 
statistically significant empirical exclusion, of so-called “neutral” employment 
rules).  
 The EEOC hired as its expert a prize-winning women’s historian, Rosalind 
Rosenberg,77 who testified and presented affidavits of opinion that women did not 
seek such risker, “harder” jobs, but preferred to work with the greater certainty and 
ease of “softer” item jobs; therefore the absence of women in such jobs was the 
result of their “choice,” not the result of employer discrimination.  On the other side 
was an equally notable women’s historian (of labor in particular), Alice Kessler 
Harris78  who testified that if women did not apply for or get hired for those jobs it 
was due to discriminatory factors, including both those explicitly and subtly 
enforced by employers, as well as by “socially constructed” expectations of the 
larger society which constructed the labor market. Professor Kessler Harris’ 
                                                        
76 See Ruth Milkman, ‘Women’s History and the Sears Case,’ (1986)  12 Feminist 
Studies 375. 
77 Rosalind Rosenberg, Beyond Separate Spheres: Intellectual Roots of Modern 
Feminism (New Haven: Yale University Press 1982). 
78 Alice Kessler Harris, Out to Work: A History of Wage Earning Women in the United 
States (1982). 
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testimony and affidavits described many situations in which women, were in fact,  
quite interested in more difficult, harder machinery employment (e.g. during World 
War II and among different classes of workers).  Both the trial and appellate courts, 
despite many briefs and arguments from feminist historians and law professors on 
the plaintiff’s side,79 ruled in favor of Sears (finding no evidence of discrimination) 
and for the most part, not taking much notice of the larger debate among the 
academics on both sides of the case.80   
 In this case most feminist legal academics (but not all!) were aligned with the 
Kessler-Harris-plaintiff side of the case. Even if some women might have had 
different “preferences” for particular jobs, those preferences were likely the product 
of discriminatory “socialization” processes, not physical or biological differences, 
and the “preferences” (whether real or not) of some should never prevent the hiring 
or promotion of the few who actively sought or wanted such jobs and should have 
been encouraged to apply for them. Thus, issues of litigation strategy (class actions 
vs. individual cases; disparate treatment and disparate impact, statistical vs. 
testimonial evidence) made more complex some of the underlying conceptions of 
gender and its treatment in the law. 
 The next and probably most dramatic split among legal feminists came with 
what later became known as the “pornography debate.” As perhaps the most 
original and important feminist legal theorist of this time, Catherine Mackinnon’s 
“sexual dominance” theory of women’s subordination  became a powerful 
organizing principle for the feminist movement, as class had been for Marx.81  
                                                        
79 Professor Rosenberg was denounced at several academic historians meetings for 
her work for Sears and later wrote that she was isolated by other feminist 
historians. In this case Professor Kessler Harris commanded the greater number of 
supporters among legal academics, including many who were “special” or 
“difference” feminists in other contexts.  
80 See discussion in Chused and Williams, Ibid note  24.   
81 See Catherine Mackinnon,  Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law,  
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press 1987); Id. Toward a Feminist Theory of the 
State (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ. Press  1989); Id. ‘Feminism, Marxism, 
Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, ‘(1982)  7 Signs Journal of Women In 
Culture and Society 515. 
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Already one of the creative “authors” of the new legal theory of sexual harassment 
as a civil wrong (tort) and ultimately an employment discrimination theory,82 
Mackinnon partnered with feminist activist Andrea Dworkin to frame a creative 
cause of action to attack the abuse of women in pornography. Rather than arguing 
for the criminalization of pornography, which given American Constitutional law, 
was likely to meet with freedom of speech (First Amendment) objections,83 
Mackinnon framed a civil action (tort) which permitted any women who was 
“harmed” in any way by pornography to bring a damage action against the offending 
pornographers. The harms covered by the statute she wrote included not only the 
physical harms to those who acted in pornography films or photography but harms 
experienced by any woman who could prove she had been ill used (dominated by 
men, coerced in any way) or affected adversely by pornographic-subordinated 
depictions of women. The city of Minneapolis (Mackinnon taught at the University of 
Minnesota) and Indianapolis (in alignment with some conservative forces) enacted 
Mackinnon’s famous pornography ordinance, allowing such civil actions to be 
brought.  
 This was among the most creative forms of feminist lawmaking ever—
reconceptualization of a harm to be rectified by a civil action and monetary damages 
(and injunctions) rather than criminal punishment, with women, rather than men, 
defining for themselves what was considered harmful.84   Almost immediately, 
another group of feminists, aligned with freedom of speech and expression 
advocates, and the more sexual liberation and lesbian part of the feminist 
                                                        
82 Catherine Mackinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (New Haven: Yale 
University Press 1979). 
83 Catherine Mackinnon, Only Words (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
1993). 
84 See explication of this legal story by one of the nation’s great constitutional 
scholars in Paul Brest, & N. Vandenberg, ‘Politics, Feminism and the Constitution: 
The Anti-pornography Movement in Minneapolis,’ (1987) 39 Stanford Law Review 
607. 
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movement aligned against Mackinnon and the Anti-pornography movement and 
joined in lawsuits to have the new statute declared unconstitutional.85  
 There ensued a storm of controversies, conferences and highly politicized 
confrontations between several parts of the feminist movement. Those opposing the 
anti-pornography ordinance claimed it was based on a theory of women’s passivity 
and inability to choose (and even consume) different models and practices of 
sexuality and that it would result in censorship of such important books as the 
feminist manifesto for health (with sexually explicit photographs), Our Bodies, 
Ourselves  by the Boston Women’s Health Collective, a virtual “bible” of women’s 
health issues for the feminist movement.86 On the anti-pornography side, feminist 
legal theorists and practitioners argued that the ordinance gave women the right to 
choose their own litigation strategies and to seek compensation and other relief for 
domestic violence “caused” by pornography.87 For several years, formerly good 
friends and compatriots in the feminist legal movement argued with each other, 
both in public and privately, and some stopped speaking to each other altogether. 
Ultimately, the anti-censorship movement won their victory in the US Supreme 
Court when the court struck down the ordinance as violative of First Amendment 
protections for free speech and expression (as being too vague and overbroad.)88 
                                                        
85 See  e.g. Sylvia Law and Nan Hunter, Brief Amicus Curiae of Feminist Anti-
Censorship Task Force et. Al in American Booksellers v . Hudnut,  (1987) 21 Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform 69 (known as the FACT “brief” arguing against censorship or 
explicitly sexual materials as detrimental to women’s freedom of choice). 
86 Our Bodies, Ourselves  (Boston: Boston Women’s Health Collective, first published 
in 1971). 
87 This claim of causation in turn led to an explosive period in social science and law 
as scholars and social scientists tried to “prove” or disprove that pornography was a 
contributing “cause” of men’s violence toward women, see Neil Malamuth, (1998). 
Commentary on pornography research and testimony before the Attorney 
General’s Commission on Pornography.  13 Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 528-
529 -543; Attorney General Commission on Pornography (1987). 
88 American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). The United States 
Supreme Court has an extensive and complex jurisprudence on when and how 
pornography and obscenity can be regulated, restricted or criminalized (famously, 
“we know it when we see it”, see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Potter 
Stewart, J. concurrence). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954126
 25 
 The issues of women’s “equality” or “sameness” or “differences” from men 
(and from each other) were formed in the disputes that arose around legal 
strategies in particular cases. In the mid-1980’s these issues grew larger with a new 
generation of feminist jurisprudents and theorists who explored gender differences 
through philosophical, sociological, psychological and literary criticism lenses.89  In 
1982 Carol Gilligan, a developmental and social psychologist, published In A 
Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development,90 which argued, 
from several empirical studies, that women and men engaged in different styles of 
moral reasoning, with boys using a “logic” of individualism, property and ownership 
principles and hierarchical values, and girls using a “web of connection” to hold 
people and values together simultaneously in a more “horizontal” relationship. This 
book and its theories exploded with acclaim and derision in feminist theory 
generally and in law in particular.91   
 Equality feminists feared that acknowledgement of any biological or 
sociological “differences” would allow legal concepts and doctrines to continue to 
support different and subordinate treatment of women in so many spheres of legal 
                                                        
89 See e.g. Robin West,  ‘The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: A 
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory,’  (1987) 2 Wisconsin Women’s 
Law Journal 81; Robin West,  ‘Jurisprudence and Gender,” (1988)   55 University of 
Chicago Law Review 1; Robin West, Caring for Justice (New York: NYU Press 1997). 
See also Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine, eds. The Future of Difference (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press 1985);  Virginia Goldner, ‘Toward 
a Critical Relational Theory of Gender,’  1992,  1 Psychoanalytic Dialogues 249; . 
90 Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological  Theory and Women’s 
Development  (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1982); see also Joan C. 
Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care  (New York: 
Routledge 1993). 
91 I was among the protagonists in the legal theory disputes, see  Ellen DuBois, Mary 
C. Dunlap, Carol Gilligan, Catherine Mackinnon and Carrie Menkel-Meadow,  
‘Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law—A Conversation,’ (1985) 34 Buffalo 
Law Review 11;  Carrie Menkel-Meadow,  ‘Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations 
on a Women’s Lawyering Process (1985) 1 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 39; 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Portia Redux: Another Look at  Gender Feminism and Legal 
Ethics, (1994)  2 Virginia Journal of  Social Policy and Law 75. See Symposium 
Women and Morality, (1983) 50 Social Research  487-695. 
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regulation92—family law, labor law (“protective” labor legislation), criminal law,  
and economic regulations, as well as the all important interpretations of the Equal 
Protection clause in Constitutional law. “Difference” feminists sought legal and 
nuanced recognition of the complexity of gender identity and social structuring., 
optimistically believing that the law would be able to distinguish unlawful 
subordinate treatments (exclusion of women) from necessary acknowledgement of 
different treatment (pregnancy) and even some “temporary” affirmative action of 
special treatment to achieve substantive equality.93 Many “difference” feminists 
took their arguments from biological and social science, as well as from European 
literary and psychoanalytic theory, particularly the work of French feminists, Julie 
Kristeva, Helene Cixious and Luce Iragary 94who deconstructed the oppression of 
gender in body, language and philosophy to recreate a “feminine” new consciousness 
in self-conception, writing, literature, morality, physicality and ultimately a 
valorization of “the feminine” for an alternative “truth.” (see discussion of post-
modernism in Section V below). 
 Although “equality” feminists and “difference” feminists often shared the 
same goals of removal of oppressive and exclusionary laws and legal treatment of 
women that would encourage their equal participation in social, legal, work and 
family life, these schools of thought differed on whether it mattered if the “origins” 
of differences were traced to “essentialist” and biological “sex” or socially 
constructed or socialized “gender” ( a debate now raging in the transgender, LGBT 
human rights movement). “Difference” feminists who focused on socially 
constructed difference were labeled “cultural feminists,” both by themselves and 
others because they often argued that  regardless of its origins, women’s 
“connection” to others (notably children and family) and heightened sense of 
responsibility, produced a different conception of the purposes of law –to provide 
                                                        
92 Joan Williams, ‘Deconstructing Gender,’ (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 797. 
93 See arguments canvassed in desegregation of Virginia Military Institute,  United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515  (1996). 
94 Domna Stanton, ‘Language and Revolution: The Franco-American Dis-Connection,’ 
in The Future of Difference (Hester Eisenstein and Alice Jardine, eds. New Brunswick, 
N.J. Rutgers University Press (1985). 
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positive rights (not only liberal values of autonomy) but social welfare rights and 
different conceptions of constitutional obligations and duties, as well as different 
conceptions of tort and contractual liability.95 My own work on negotiation and  
legal dispute resolution (in “adjectival” or procedural law) sought to reconstruct 
conventional categories of game theoretic distributional and legal adversarial “zero-
sum” acts of competition over scarce resources to the recognition in legal problem 
solving of  needs and interest based efforts to  pursue joint, not only individual, gain 
and social resource expansion and more “just” and integrative allocations.96 
 Thus, cultural or difference feminists made enormously creative 
interventions into the jurisprudential discussions of what law is for, what ends it 
should serve, what legal claims can be made, what processes should be used to 
effectuate its aims and what remedies it should offer. Although equality feminist 
theorists accused difference feminists of assuming too much “passivity” or 
deterministic definitions of identity and gender content, cultural feminists in fact 
embraced more agentic and “plastic” conceptions of the role of women in the law. 
Feminists could create new legal claims and theories (sexual harassment, domestic 
violence, anti-pornography civil actions, “intersectionality”(see section IV below), 
advocate for different interpretations of old doctrines (hedonic measures, contract 
formation) and pursue new remedies (restraining orders, new forms of damages 
and civil actions and new definitions of rape and domestic violence).  Cultural 
feminists also argued that theirs was a theoretical approach that in fact allowed for 
cultural change and adaptation and a continually changing, evolving and relational 
sense of gender identity and legal treatment. This argument later became important 
                                                        
95 Robin West, note   87 ;  Leslie Bender, ‘A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and 
Tort,’ (1988) 38 Journal of Legal Education 3; Clare Dalton, ‘An Essay in the 
Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, ‘ (1984) 94 Yale Law Journal 997; Mary Jo 
Frug, ‘Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of Contracts Casebooks, (1985) 34 
American University Law Review 1065. 
96 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Toward Another View of Legal  Negotiation: The 
Structure of Problem Solving, (1984)  31 UCLA Law Review 754. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954126
 28 
for the growing recognition of cultural change in gender roles and studies among 
those who also focused on “masculinities.”97 
 Feminist legal academics were also important in this era (1980s) in the 
development of “critical feminist theory” a dialogic and critical encounter with the 
New Left Critical Legal Studies movement in American Law from the 1980’s, 
lingering until the late 1990s. Active in the founding of Critical Legal Studies (a left 
critique of the indeterminacy of the American common and constitutional law 
regimes that allowed courts to exploit their class preferences in legal 
interpretation98), feminist law professors developed a critique of Critical Legal 
Studies’ own masculinist, dominating, Marxist approach to law and legal decision 
making and organized the first Critical Legal Feminist meeting to use “feminist 
processes”  (smaller group discussions, uses of literary texts and films, uses of 
feminist consciousness raising methods)and theories for discussion.99  Critical 
feminist theorists were concerned about the deconstruction of the importance of 
“legal rights” as indeterminate in  the critical legal studies canon of thought. 
Women’s progress, after all, had been marked throughout the “equality” period with 
some successful claims for “equal rights” under the “positive” law of the Constitution 
and other legal statutory regimes. Opening up a serious discourse of the role of 
“rights” and the  State100 in furthering or hindering civil and human rights, the 
feminist critique of critical legal studies soon inspired an explosion of work in 
                                                        
97 Ann C. McGinley, Masculinity at Work  (New York: NYU Press 2016). 
98 Duncan Kennedy and Karl Klare, ‘A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies,’ (1984) 
94 Yale Law Journal 461;  Mark Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987); Roberto Unger, Knowledge and Politics 
(1975); Roberto Unger, ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement, “  (1983) 96 Harvard 
Law Review  561. 
99 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies and 
Legal Education, or “the Fem-Crits” Go to Law School,’  (1988) 38 Journal of Legal 
Education 61. 
100 See DuBois et. al, Ibid note  91 for a spirited debate about the role of the state in 
improving or diminishing the quality of women’s lives.. I argued there that women’s 
relationship to the state was ambivalent- both wanting its protection and promises 
of equality but recognizing its role in the legalization of women’s historical 
oppression. 
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Critical Race studies, a parallel exploration of the role of legal rights and strategies 
versus political and social movements in the American quest for racial justice and 
equality (see Section IV below). 
 
IV. Multi-cultural or Diversity Feminism 
As newly admitted to the profession, women legal academics (mostly white) 
grappled and contested with each other over issues of work, family, reproductive 
rights, pornography, sex and prostitution, a third generation of new entrants, more 
diverse in race and ethnicity, and somewhat more diverse in class background, burst 
on the theory scene to challenge and critique the new field of feminist legal theory, 
sometimes from a sympathetic “inside” view, but more often with a sense of outrage, 
outsider perspective and challenge to claims of “universal” essentialism of “women’s 
situation” in the law. Several powerful theorists, including Angela Harris, Patricia 
Williams, Mari Matsuda and Kimberle Crenshaw, among others, awakened their 
sisters in theory development to “multiple consciousness”101 and the need to 
understand and “see” the reality of the lives of women of color (Black, Asian, Latina, 
Native and  “other”) in both law reform and theoretical projects.  At the same time, 
the Lesbian challenge to heterosexist notions of marriage, family and social life also 
challenged many assumptions made (whether implicitly or explicitly) in the work of 
the first two generations.102 
 Law professors who were/are also women of color argued that anti-
discrimination law (Crenshaw) and feminist theory in general (Harris) ignored the 
particular experiences of Black (and Latina (Montoya) and Asian-American 
(Matsuda) women by assuming that family and reproductive rights issues meant 
challenging the “separate spheres”  doctrine (women traditionally in the home, now 
seeking employment) and failed to take account of the experiences of minority 
                                                        
101 Mari Matsuda, “When the first Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as 
Jurisprudence,’  (1989) 11 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 7. 
102 See also,  Francisco Valdez, ‘Sex and Race in Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on 
Identities and Inter-Connectivities,” (1995) 5 Southern California Review of Law 
and Women’s Studies 25. 
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female work (and exploitation in  lower paid jobs), where the “luxury” of staying 
home and the valorization, of  “traditional” motherhood were often unavailable. 
Stereotypes of gender when coupled with race or ethnicity (the “China doll” or Black 
or Latina domestic worker) demonstrated that women of color did not share the 
assumed uniform experiences of white (presumably middle class) women as 
feminist theory formed on individualistic “equality” models. Women of 
subordinated or dominated races and ethnicities had/have more complicated 
relationships, they argued, with their similarly subordinated or dominated male 
relatives, companions and group members. Thus, among the major contributions of 
this newer and more diverse feminist theorizing was to : 
 1. problematize “equality” theories based on individual rights of access  and 
measurement of comparisons of “merit” to (white) men (in employment, family 
rights, constitutional law); 
 2. question the assumptions of “women’s” experiences as mothers or rape 
victims103 as “essentially” derived from white women’s experiences; 
 3. demonstrate the “intersectionality” of discrimination and subordination in 
more complex demographic “identities” (Black women had to be either “Black” or 
“female” to succeed in early employment discrimination cases; there was no formal 
legal recognition of “Black women” as a separate legally protected category; welfare 
polices were often directed at conceptions of welfare recipients as “undeserving” 
Black women (“the welfare queen” stereotype);104 
                                                        
103 In American history, Black women had been raped, with impunity, for over one 
hundred years, as slaves and domestic workers, see Patricia Williams, “On Being the 
Object of Property, in The Alchemy of Race and Rights and ‘Alchemical Notes: 
Reconstructed Ideals from Deconstructed Rights,’ (1987), 22 Harvard Civil Rights-
Civil Liberties Law Review 401 (describing the phenomenological differences in the 
“experience” of legal rights of white and Black people). 
104 Kaaryn Gustafson, ‘Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-
Income Women,’ (2013) 3 University of California Irvine Law Review 297; Kaaryn 
Gustafson, ‘Breaking Vows: Marriage Promotion, The New Patriarchy and the 
Retreat from Equalitarianism,’ (2009) 5 Stanford Journal of Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties 269. 
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 4. illuminate the complexity of group membership and contradictory pulls on 
identity; minority women suffered greatly from domestic violence and at the same 
time were active as mothers, sisters, daughters, wives and companions in  
representing and supporting male offenders in prison and criminal justice reform 
(now particularly salient again in the Black Lives Matter movement in the United 
States); minority women often work for “justice” not only as women but as 
members of other historically subordinated groups;105 
 5. interrogate the class assumptions in much of the earlier feminist theory; 
although “sex plus” doctrines sought recognition of the multiplicity of ways that 
gender could be experienced through the lens of gender interacting with other 
characteristics,  critical race theory coupled with critical feminist race theory,106 
demonstrated that women of color often suffered from many simultaneous forms of 
stereotyping and interactive identity assumptions. Thus, simple legal categories of 
“gender” or “race” or “ethnicity” failed to fully capture the particular forms of 
discrimination suffered and provide adequate remedies.; 
 6. acknowledge that different experiences of patriarchy (marriage as 
desirable or not), parenthood and criminalization (disparities in drug, sexual assault, 
welfare fraud definitions and law enforcement) might militate in favor of more 
complicated and variable efforts to reform the law;   
 7. narrate the particularities of the differences of women’s lives. The brilliant 
linkage of storytelling (by among, others,107 Patricia Williams,108 and Mari 
                                                        
105 See the difficult (for many feminists) case of Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436  
U.S.49 (1978) in which tribal definitions of voting rights and citizenship was held to 
“trump” gender equal protection provisions in the United States Constitution. 
106 Dorothy Roberts, ‘BlackCrit Theory and the Problem of Essentialism,’ (1998) 53 
U. Miami Law Review 855.; see generally Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal 
Studies Movement, 22 Harvard Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review (1987). 
107 The use of storytelling and narrative to “counter” universalist legal 
generalizations began with the work of Derrick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: 
The Permanence of Racism (New York: Basic Books: 1987) (and the novelist Toni 
Morrison, see e.g. Sula (1973) and Beloved (1987). 
108 Patricia Williams, ‘On Being the Object of Property’ in The Alchemy of Race and 
Rights: Diary of a Law Professor (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
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Matsuda109) to challenges of conventional legal categories and the call for “outsider” 
voices to be heard in legal argument and doctrinal formation has inspired a whole 
new generation of critical race/gender theorists to argue against “over abstraction” 
in legal theory and to “particularize” and study (empirically110) the concrete 
conditions of women’s needs in the law; 
 8. challenge all assumptions about male dominance of women made on 
assumptions of heterosexuality; 
 9. recognize that gender is often “relational” to other categories of identity, 
both subjective and objective, and dependent on how it is used in particular 
contexts111and 
 10. produce more diverse discussion and ideas in law school classrooms.112 
 This paradigm shifting move to more “bottom-up,” empirical particularism 
has broadened the issues of concern to feminist legal academics to a whole set of 
“newer” issues of gender, legal theory and legal doctrine and policy as experienced 
“on the ground”:  immigration,113 religion, human rights, globalized labor, and  
prostitution114 and human trafficking,115 among others, often exposing the painful 
divisions among feminists who have “multi-cultural” or “multi-dimensional 
                                                        
109 Mari Matsuda, Where is Your Body?: Essays on Race, Gender and the Law, 
(Boston: Beacon Press (1996) 
110 A new generation of critical race/gender scholars has formed around “empirical 
critical race studies”, see e.g. Mario Barnes, ‘Empirical Methods and Critical Race 
Theory: A Discourse on Possibilities for a Hybrid Methodology, 2016 Wisconsin Law 
Review 2043; Kimani Paul-Emile, ‘Foreword: Critical Race Theory and Empirical 
Methods Conference (2015) 83 Fordham Law Review 2953. 
111 Martha Minow, ‘Justice Engendered: The Supreme Court Term 1986,’ (1987) 101 
Harvard Law Review 10; Martha Minow, Making all the Difference: Inclusion, 
Exclusion and American Law Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University Press 1990). 
112 Meera E. Deo, ‘Paint by Number? How Race and Gender in Law School Faculty 
Affect the First Year Curriculum,’ (2010) 29 Chicano/Latino Law Review 1; Id. 
‘Faculty Insights on Educational Diversity,’  (2015) 83 Fordham Law Review 3115. 
113 See Jennifer Chacon, ‘Feminists at the Border: Militarism in the Work of Ann 
Scales,’ (2013) 91 Denver University Law Review 85. 
114 Amy J. Cohen, ‘Trauma and the Welfare State: A Genealogy of Prostitution Courts 
in New York City,’ (2017) Texas Law Review. 
115 Aya Gruber, Amy Cohen and Kate Mogulescu, ‘Penal Welfare and the New Human 
Trafficking Intervention Courts, (2017) Florida Law Review. 
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consciousnesses”. Consider the conflicts among this generation of feminist legal 
academics on such issues as veiling and headscarves,116 female genital 
circumcision,117 single-sex education,118 food production and consumption,119 
military service and peace, among others.120 
 
V. Post-Modern Feminism 
Just as demographic and theory-driven disruptions to the first waves of legal 
feminisms were beginning to challenge essentialist notions of “women’s issues”  and 
feminist theory,  intellectual movements from outside, in European post-modern 
and post-structuralist theory in philosophy, literature and ultimately (through 
Critical Legal Studies), American legal theory also challenged universal or 
essentialist ideas about gender in law.  Legal academic (Professor at New England 
School of Law) Mary Jo Frug, a post-modern feminist (whose murder near her home 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts in  1991 was never solved) wrote most extensively at 
the beginning of the “post-modernist” turn that gender is “constituted” by words, 
language, interpretations by particular authoritative figures (male scholars and 
judges) and she urged new conceptions of legal ideas from the “deconstructive” 
analysis which became so important in literary criticism. Nothing in “modern” 
categories are to be taken for granted as “stable” or fixed meanings. Women are 
sometimes “equal” to or “the same as men” (perhaps in work performance), but also 
                                                        
116 The Burqa Affair Across Europe  (Alessandro Ferrari and Sabrina Pastorelli, eds.) 
(Routledge, 2016);  S.A.S. v France, 2014 Eur. Ct. H. R. 695;  R (Begum) v. 
Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School, 2006 U.K. H. L. 15 (see 
decisions of Brenda Hale, J.) 
117 Isabelle Gunning,  ‘Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural 
Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, ‘ (1992) 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 189. 
118 United States v. Virginia Military Institute, 518 U.S.  515 (1996, Ruth Ginsburg J.) 
119 Amy J. Cohen, ‘Everything is Not About Convenience: State, Family, and 
Supermarket in Middle-Class West Bengal’ (2017) University of California Irvine 
Law Review;  Id. ‘The Law and Political Economy of Contemporary Food: Some 
Reflections on the Local and the Small,’ (2015) 78 Law & Contemporary Problems 
101. 
120 Susan Moller Okin, Is Multi-Culturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton University 
Press 1999). 
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they are different at the same time (in capacity to become pregnant and bear 
children). Women are not all alike—they are different among their own 
gender/biological classifications—some are white, some are of color, they have 
different sexual orientations and desires, they are of different classes and they value 
and identify differentially with men, with political movements and with social 
institutions. They are sometimes agentic and in control of their own destinies and 
sometimes they are “dominated” or “abused” or “exploited” by men. Women often 
have different interpretations of the same texts (law, erotic texts, literature), but 
their “power” to  interpret as authority or law is often still unequal to men.  Frug’s 
arguments were that legal interpretations and concepts embedded in law  often 
“constructed” women as maternal, unequal, sexualized, terrorized and weak 
(historically unable to make and enforce contracts in business, in labor, etc.). But, at 
the same time Frug, and other post-modernists, saw gender and interpretation as 
“fluid,”  “plastic” and mutable by legal advocacy, and by textual and political 
interpretation.   
 Frug was among the first legal academics, along with Clare Dalton, another 
Contracts (at Harvard) professor to “deconstruct” common contracts doctrines 
(impossibility of performance, enforceability of domestic promises) and to suggest 
that feminists could (and did) successfully re-interpret conventional legal doctrines 
,to produce greater gender justice. In one of her most sustained and creative works, 
Frug completed a literary and legal exegesis of the conventional, male authored, 
Contracts text121 she was teaching with to interrogate and upend conventional 
interpretations of what promises should be legally enforced, how women were 
conceptualized in contracts cases (weak, needing of protection, lacking capacity), 
how law structured remedies and how women authors might write a different text 
and develop different doctrines, reclaiming women’s interests in conventional 
doctrine and interpretation.122 As I discuss in the next section, the post-modern 
“move” in legal theory, while often criticized for being “indeterminate” and 
                                                        
121 J. Dawson, W. Harvey & S. Henderson, Cases and Comment on Contracts (4th ed. 
1982). 
122 See Mary Jo Frug, Postmodern Legal Feminism (Routledge, 1992) at 53-124. 
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destructive of stable meaning, in fact was instrumental in opening up legal concepts 
and doctrines not typically associated with “women’s issues” to feminist analysis 
and re-interpretations. In this sense, the post-modernists made great and creative 
contributions to new ideas in law and new methods of interpretation. 
 The contributions of post-modernist scholars like Frug, Dalton, later Janet 
(Ian) Halley and others in the 1990s and onward were to: 
 1. see gender as always fluid, contingent and  relational (differing in  context); 
 2. emphasize the agency of feminists to self-describe and “perform” gender,123 
and to wrest control of definitions away from others (men, authority figures, legal 
interpreters124); 
 3. analyze the discursive process by which language and law both create 
categories that become “reified” and made “real” but also can be destroyed or re-
interpreted by different actors (consider the evolution of marital rape and the 
complex issues surrounding what  constitutes “consent” to rape in different 
contexts125); 
 4. problematize the “binary” of definitive gender lines; along with lesbians, gay 
activists, trans and bi-sexual , queer theorists,126 post-modern feminists see gender 
and sex as having blurred boundaries,127 allowing greater choice than stable legal 
                                                        
123 Judith Butler,  Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity 
(Routledge, 1990)’ Id. Undoing Gender (2004). 
124 An important part of feminist legal theory was to explore the epistemology of 
knowledge, understanding that knowledge itself is produced and created through 
the gender lenses of the creator of knowledge, see, e.g. Sandra Harding, The Science 
Question in Feminism,  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Sandra Harding, 
Whose Science, Whose Knowledge: Thinking from Women’s Lives (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press 1991).   
125 Robin West,  ‘Sex, Law and Consent,’  In  THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE (Alan Wertheimer & William Miller eds. 2008); Katherine Franke, 
‘Theorizing Yes,” (2001), 101 Columbia Law Review 181. 
126 Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics and the 
Limits of Law (Duke University Press, 2015);  Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and 
Why to Take a Break From Feminism, (Princeton University  Press, 2008);  Eve 
Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (University of California Press, 1990). 
• 127 So did Sigmund Freud,  in his theories of polymorphous perversity, Freud, 
Sigmund. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud. (Trans. James Strachey. 24 vols. London: Hogarth, 1953–74). 
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gender categories permit, not only in choices about sexuality and “cross-dressing”128 
: 
 5. consider how the constitutive processes of law both disadvantage or 
advantage gender  in particular contexts and how such processes can be “used” to 
create and change legal meanings.129 
 Though critics fear that the fluidity and indeterminacy of interpretations 
around gender and sex will hinder a “unified” theory or legal strategy to deal with 
continued gender inequality,130 the richness of the feminist deconstructive, post-
“structuralist” turn in questioning all legal categories, has, in my view, produced 
some of the most creative interpretations, new concepts, legal memes, and 
reinterpretations of law, explored below. 
 
Vi. Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Memes in Law and Legal Education 
 The increased number of women legal academics in the 1980s and 1990s did not 
mean they were all focused on so-called “women’s subjects.”  But, with a feminist 
sensibility, many of these new entrants began to question conventional “man-made” 
legal doctrine, even without the literary and philosophical abstractions of post-
structuralist theory.  Here I review just a few of these feminist contributions to 
general legal theories and doctrines.131 As I was wont to say in the early years of this 
effort some decades ago, the question of “assimilation,”  “integration” or 
“mainstreaming” of any “outsider” theory or doctrine is the problem of whether 
                                                        
128 Duncan Kennedy, “Sexy Dressing, Etc.: Essays on the Power and Politics of Cultural 
Identity, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
129 Dennis Patterson, ‘Postmodernism/Feminism/Law,’ (1992) 77 Cornell Law 
Review 254. 
130 Catherine Mackinnon, ‘Points Against Postmodernism,’ (2000) 75 Chicago-Kent 
Law Review 687. 
131 For a fuller, if earlier review,  see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, (1992) ‘Mainstreaming 
Feminist Legal Theory, 23 Pacific Law Review 1493. See also Mary Dunlap, ‘The “F” 
Word: Mainstreaming and Marginalizing Feminism,’ (1989-90) 4 Berkeley’s Women 
Law Journal 251 (discussing how the US Supreme Court dealt with feminist 
challenges to Constitutional and other cases). 
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there will be enough “chocolate” in the marble cake or as said more recently, more 
than just “chocolate chips in the vanilla ice cream.”132 
 Feminist attention to women’s issues made Constitutional “equal protection” 
concepts more complex (formal or substantive equality?)  (e.g., see discussion of 
pregnancy above, and the “sameness-difference” debates), challenged American 
conceptions of  “freedom of expression” in First Amendment jurisprudence and the 
pornography debate133 (which differed from the more successful efforts of Canadian 
feminists and constitutionalists on the same issue134), changed the definitions of 
rape  (including marital rape) and consent in criminal law,135 which in turn modified 
important evidence doctrine,136 introduced new criminal  law defenses to murder or 
injury (“battered woman syndrome”137), created a new cause of action (under both 
common law tort doctrine and also in statutory definitions of employment 
discrimination) for sexual harassment,138 and, of course, challenged many concepts 
                                                        
132 See also Richard Delgado , “The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil 
Rights Literature (1984)   132 U. Penn. Law Review 561; Menkel- Meadow, Ibid, 
note 132 and  “Michael” in Meera Deo, ‘Faculty Insights on Diversity in the 
Classroom,’ (2015) 83 Fordham Law Review 3115, at 3147. 
133 Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, Final Report (department of 
Justice, 1986), the “Meese Report”, cf.  Nadine Strossen, Defending Pornography: Free 
Speech, Sex and the Fight for Women’s Rights (1995); see also, Henry Louis Gates, 
Anthony Griffen, Donald Lively, Robert Post, William Rubenstein and Nadine 
Strossen, Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties (1994); Catherine Mackinnon, Only Words (Harvard University Press, 
1993). 
134 Katherine Gelber and Adrienne Stone, ‘Constitutions, Gender and Freedom of 
Expression,’ in Research Handbook on Gender and Constitutions (Helen Irving and 
Ruth Rubio-Marin, eds. Forthcoming). 
135 Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Yale University Press 1987); Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, 
‘Theory, Practice and Perception in Rape Law Reform,’ (1989) 23 Law & Society 
Review 949. 
136 Leon Letwin, ‘Unchaste Character: Ideology and California Evidence Rape Laws, 
(1980) 54 Southern California Law Review 35; Margaret Berger, ‘Man’s Trial, 
Women’s Tribulations: Rape Cases in the Courtroom,’ (1977) 77 Columbia Law 
Review 1. 
137 Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Law Making (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2002). 
138 Catherine Mackinnon, Sexual Harassment  of Working Women (Yale University 
Press, 1978). 
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in conventional family law (child custody, alimony and marital support,  and legal 
benefits for unmarried co-habitation139). 
 Feminist legal theorists also contributed ideas and re-interpretations of more 
conventional legal doctrines, such as the presumed “reasonable man”  in American 
tort law,140 and its presumptions of a “neutral” and “objective” standard of legal 
liability. Feminists questioned the definitions and assessments of compensable 
harms in tort law141 and suggested that both standards of liability and compensable 
claims (a different form of loss of consortium) would apply if a “reasonable” 
woman’s” conceptions were included in the tort canon (later criticized for 
essentializing women as much as the male “objective” standard for correct human 
behavior). 
 Feminist contracts scholars suggested that recognition of only commercial 
contract and not domestic contracts failed to take account of legal realities,142 such 
as family owned businesses, as well as ante and post-nuptial agreements,143 as well 
as now far more complex contracting around reproductive issues.144 Such contracts 
are now often the subject of adjudication in state courts.  
                                                        
139 Grace Blumberg, ‘Adult Derivative Benefits in Social Security, (1980) 32 Stanford 
Law Review 233; Grace Blumberg, ‘Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different 
Perspective, (1981) 28 UCLA Law Review 1125; Frances Olsen, ‘The Family and the 
Market, (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 1497. 
140 Leslie Bender, ‘A Feminist Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort,’ (1988) 38 
Journal of Legal Education 3;  Lucinda Finley, ‘A Break in the Silence: Including 
Women’s Issues in a Torts Course,’  (1989)1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 41. 
141 Robin West, ‘The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives,” (1985)  3 Wisconsin 
Women’s Law Journal 81. 
142 Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, (1985) 94 Yale 
Law Journal 997; Mary Jo Frug, ‘Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Post-Modern 
Feminist Analysis of Contract Law (1992) 140 U Penn. Law Review 1029. 
143 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (California 1976) in which the California 
Supreme Court enforced a contract for marital like benefits and promises made 
between co-habitants who were not formally married. 
144 Michele Goodwin, Baby Markets and Money: the New Politics of  Creating Families 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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 Feminist property scholars questioned the very definitions of legally 
recognized “property”  rights in ownership (slavery145), bodies,  body parts,146 
reproduction (fetuses), reputation,  “intangible” interests in investments of future 
spousal income, 147  and now intellectual property and property rights in culture 
(presciently predicting some of the most contested issues in intellectual property 
law now).148 
 Beyond what are often considered “core” doctrinal areas of law, feminist 
legal scholars have made many contributions and interventions in both substantive 
and adjectival areas of law.  A new generation of feminist scholars, has suggested 
that  “feminist governance”149 (building on older theories of collaborative or 
experimentalist governance and “feminist public administration”150) will modify 
administrative, legislative and even judicial regulation (in a common law system) to 
be more “responsive” to the particularities of “lived experiences” in a variety of 
areas (family law and domestic violence, labor conditions, prostitution and vice, 
food and workplace safety), by avoiding overly generalized, universalized and 
abstract ideas for regulation, and focusing instead on social problem solving,  
                                                        
145 Patricia Williams, On Being the Object of Property, (1988) 14 Signs 5. 
146 Michele Goodwin, Black Markets: The Supply and Demands of Body Parts 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
147 Grace Blumberg, ‘Identifying and Valuing Goodwill at Divorce,’ (1992) Law and 
Contemporary Problems. 
148 Margaret Radin, ‘Property and Personhood,’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 
957; Margaret Radin, Market (in)Alienability (1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 1849; 
Carol Rose, ‘Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground (1992) 78 Virginia 
Law Review 421; Ruth Okedejii, ‘Contracts, Persons and Property: A Tribute to 
Margaret Jane Radin, 22 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law 
Review 143 (2015). 
149 Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswarin, Rachel Rebouche and Hila Shamir, Governance 
Feminism: A Handbook (University of Minnesota, forthcoming) 
150 Cynthia Farina, ‘Getting From There to Here,’ (1991) Duke Law Journal 689; 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Lawyer’s Role in Deliberative Democracy,’ 2004-5 
Nevada Law Journal 1; Kathy Ferguson, The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy 
(Philadelphia, Pa: Temple University Press,1984). 
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interventionist, therapeutic and preventative methods,  as alternatives to punitive 
and adjudicative methods, using such innovations as “problem solving courts”. 151 
 Like the earlier generation, of which I am a member, these governance 
feminists have to confront the question of the role of the state in securing equality 
and quality of life for women—in the United States (unlike in more socially 
progressive countries) this is a complex and ambivalent relationship.,152 as the state 
both giveth (some social security and welfare benefits, some legal protections in 
domestic violence153 and anti-discrimination law154) and taketh away (surveillance, 
criminalization of welfare and poverty155 and sex work, work requirements, etc. and 
ongoing rigid gender classifications in many legal spheres (military, some work and 
labor rules). 
 Like their public governance sisters, modern feminist scholars of the private 
corporation have urged more “feminist governance”, represented in the growing 
requirement in some countries for quotas of women on governing boards, arguing 
that profits are higher, management is better and corporate reputations rise with 
increased representation of women.156  These arguments for more women in 
various legal and economic institutions, of course, replicate the early issues with 
                                                        
151 Judith Kaye,  “Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look At 
How Courts are Run,’  (1997) 48 Hastings Law Journal 851. 
152 Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Harvard University 
Press 1989); DuBois, Dunlap, Gilligan, Mackinnon, Menkel-Meadow, Ibid note 81; 
Linda Gordon (ed.), Women, the State and Welfare (Madison: Wisc.: University of 
Wisconsin Press 1990). 
153 But see Jane Stoever,  Mirandizing Family Justice, 39 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Gender 189 (2016); Kristin Bumiller, In An Abusive State: How Neo-Liberalism 
Appropriated the Feminist Movement Against Sexual Violence  (Duke University 
Press, 2008). 
154 But see Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of 
Victims (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). 
155 Kaaryn Gustafson, Cheating Welfare: The Criminalization of Poverty (New York: 
NYU Press,  2011). 
156 Linda-Eling Lee, Ric Marshall, Damion Rallis and Matt Moscardi, Women on 
Boards (MSCI Research Institute, 2015); (finding that critical mass of women on 
boards increased profits and decreased governance problems);  Lahey and Salter, 
‘Corporate Law  in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From Classicism to 
Feminism, (1985) 23 Osgoode  Hall Law Journal 543. 
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“essentialism” – how do women “act” on corporate boards, differently than men? 
More responsibly? More honestly? More relationally? Feminist political scientists 
have made similar arguments for increased female representation in legislatures.157 
Similarly, feminist labor scholars have argued that the greater participation by 
women in trade unions would affect both processual decision making in unions, but 
also likely modify the issues of greatest salience to modern workers (health and 
safety,  participatory governance, as well as wages and working conditions).158 
 Feminist legal scholars of the economic order have also suggested both 
doctrinal and policy changes. Bankruptcy scholars (based on empirical work) have 
argued that individual bankruptcies (affecting women and families) may play as 
great a role in the health of an economy as corporate reorganization, and need as 
much legal attention and reform.159 Marjorie Kornhauser has argued for  changes in 
tax policy and increased progressivity as a feminist intervention in a corporatist, 
capitalist and individualist tax system in the United States.160 
 Building on second generation “cultural” or “difference” feminism, so many of 
these creative suggestions for law reform depend on  the claims that women will be 
concerned about the “relational”,  caring and interdependence of human beings in 
lawmaking. When she spearheaded the attempt to overhaul the American health 
care system in the mid 1990’s First Lady (later Secretary of State and Presidential 
candidate) Hillary Clinton heralded this claim that the nation’s health was built on 
the “interdependence” of human beings (bacteria, germs and viruses do not know 
class or borders) and it “takes a village” to raise healthy children.161   
                                                        
157 Mary Becker, ‘Politics, Differences and Economic Rights,’ (1989) University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 169. 
158 Marion Crain, ‘Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage 
Labor, ‘ (1991) 89 Michigan Law Review 1155. 
159 Theresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook, As we Forgive Our 
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 Women in international law have for decades made similar arguments about 
the need for increased inclusion of women in international law making and now in 
conflict resolution, peace negotiations,  and transitional justice.162 
 These, and many other contributions too numerous to mention here, 
demonstrate that the increased numbers of women in the legal academy has 
creatively and controversially challenged much of the conventional legal canon in so 
many areas of law. But note that even acknowledging these contributions continues 
to raise the issue of whether women “think” or “act” differently from men (and those 
who made the laws in most countries for centuries). Is there some kind of 
essentialist claim that remains? Are women making contributions to legal academe 
and legal thought through a “reactive” epistemology to what has gone before or 
creating, with agency, different conceptions of what a legal system could provide? 
 These issues continue to exist not only in substantive law, but  in procedural 
law and education as well.  American feminist legal academics have transformed 
legal education by offering smaller seminars with greater  personal self-disclosure, 
modeled on the earlier feminist consciousness raising groups of the 1960s and 
1970s. Seminars and more participatory (and clinical and experiential) legal 
education are now offered in virtually every American law school. As students 
demand more choice and less required curricula to meet the challenges of an 
increasingly complicated world, electives have now proliferated. Some scholars note 
that women professors are still disproportionately represented among those who 
counsel students, administer and manage the law school (which does include 
greater representation of women deans), but feminist and female (not always the 
same thing) professors are also increasing their productivity and recognition in 
almost  every field of law.  
 If I had to suggest one particular contribution of modern feminist law 
professors it would be called “the Contextual Turn,” as feminist legal academics have 
                                                        
162 Hillary Charlesworth, Catherine Chinkin, and Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to  
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resisted the kind of overly abstract and universalist thinking that fails to account for 
so much of our human, cultural and legal variability.  Feminist scholars are now 
working on many particular sites of the interaction of gender and law (employment, 
organizations, welfare, family life, constitutional adjudication,  contracts, property 
and torts, as well as newer areas of concern—migration, intellectual property,163 or 
my own special area of interest—different methods of legal and international 
dispute resolution164 
 
VII. Conclusions: Where do we go from here? (Post-feminism?) 
At the time of this writing women legal academics have made enormous inroads 
into the American legal academy, though many still claim underrepresentation 
(based either on comparisons to women in the workforce generally, to women in 
the legal profession,  to location within the academy,165 or by race and ethnicity166). 
One scholar, however, claims that women are now, in fact, overrepresented in the 
legal academy (as compared to their representation in the legal profession) and that 
diversity and affirmative action programs have, in his view, been largely successful, 
in the appointment of many women of color to faculties.167  In a comprehensive 
empirical study of the legal professoriate, James Lindgren argues that if any group is 
underrepresented in the legal academy it is Conservatives, Christians, Republicans 
and especially Republican women, but not white women, or women of color either.   
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 As of  the 2013-14 academic year women constituted 35.9% of all fulltime 
law teachers,  men were 64.1% of full time  teachers, compared to women as 
constituting 32.4% of all working lawyers  and men 67.6% of all working lawyers.168 
Minority (all groups combined, African-American, Asian, Hispanic and Native) 
women constituted 9.4% of the  legal professoriate (6.7% of the working legal 
profession) and minority men constituted 10.5% of the legal professoriate (and 
7.4% of the practicing legal profession169). Women are still more likely to be found 
in skills, legal writing and librarian positions in the legal academy and are also still 
underrepresented among deans (144 male deans to 58 female deans in 2013) but 
there has been a steady increase of women in full time academic positions and in 
deanships.  As of 2013, 27% of the total of legal educators were tenured  male law 
professors, and 16.3% were female so the gap at the top reaches of the profession 
are slowly closing. 
 What do these numbers mean for gender equity in the legal academy?  Many 
years ago  sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kantor, who studied women’s influence and 
participation in American corporate life, argued that it took a “critical mass” 
(somewhere over 30% of a particular workplace) for women to have two kinds of 
efficacy in the workplace: 1) to have ideas and contributions truly “heard” and 
recognized and 2) to be seen as “non-token” representatives of their demographic 
group.170  As women in the legal academy now do constitute this “critical” mass in 
numbers (nationally, that is not necessarily distributed the same way at all law 
schools171), there are several consequences of this change in the American legal 
                                                        
168 ABA  Approved Law School Staff and Faculty Members by Gender and Ethnicity; 
Lindgren, Ibid. 
169 These data are derived from the ABA data, Lindgren’s analysis that includes data 
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professoriate, especially when the female student body in American law schools has 
been near or over 50% of the total population for about twenty years.   
 First, there is still some evidence of stratification by subject matter, 
Constitutional law, at the top of the informal prestige scale, still has some 
underrepresentation of women, though that is rapidly changing with several 
distinguished women (and two former law professors) on the United States 
Supreme Court (Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Elena Kagan) now pre-eminent in the 
field (and several female Deans of major law schools who are also Constitutional 
scholars, Martha Minow (Harvard), Heather Gerken (Yale), and Kathleen Sullivan 
(Stanford), as well as legal historian Barbara Black (Columbia). Women now teach 
and publish research in virtually every area of conventional law school study 
including contracts, property, torts, civil procedure, criminal law, as well as  
business subjects, commercial law, banking, bankruptcy,  taxation, legal ethics, 
immigration, intellectual property, labor and employment law, health law, and all 
advocacy and skills subjects.  This means that for women law professors who seek 
“assimilation” or “integration” into the legal academy, almost every subject has 
become accessible for teaching and scholarly production, whether the development 
of conventional doctrinal analysis, or a particularly “feminist” take on any of these 
subjects. Gone are the days of tenure denials for women who worked primarily on 
“feminist” or “women’s issues.”172 
 At the same time, however, the increased numbers of women in the legal 
academy has ironically accompanied (or produced?) a decrease in the number of 
explicitly feminist theory, jurisprudence and “women and the law” classes. Whether 
this is due to the integration or assimilation of feminist concerns into Constitutional, 
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classrooms, scholarship and governance, see Deo, Ibid. 
172 Notorious cases in the 1980s included tenure denials at Harvard (Clare Dalton), 
Yale (Lucinda Finley) and the University of Pennsylvania (Drucilla Cornell). My 
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family, employment and criminal law classes and scholarship,173 or is the product of 
generational change, to a “post-feminist” era,174 or the deconstruction of gender into 
other critical “identity” concerns and courses,175 separate treatment of feminist 
theory and jurisprudence is clearly not as prominent as it was when there were 
fewer female legal academics. Perhaps, as my generation likes to think, it was our 
passionate commitment to feminist issues and our advocacy in both substantive and 
professional participation activities that cleared the way for new generations to 
work directly on all issues in the law (though issues of parental leave, tenure clocks, 
etc. continue to have disparate impacts on women in the professoriate, as in the 
legal profession generally.176) 
 And in a greater irony, younger generations of law students (and some 
faculty) have upturned some of the earliest feminist concerns. While my generation 
expended enormous energy on teaching, scholarship and advocacy to have rape and 
domestic violence included in the criminal  law curriculum, some young women 
have asked that these subjects not be taught (to avoid reliving their own trauma 
from these events) or that syllabi and classes be marked with “trigger warnings” so 
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students will know in advance (and can sometimes opt-out of class, for “safe 
spaces”) that these subjects will be covered.177 
 Treatment of women’s or feminist issues can now be found in several places 
in the legal academy—a few specialized courses remain, some taught as the study of 
a “historical” movement within the context of other jurisprudential schools,178 as 
assimilated into the conventional curriculum (discrimination in Constitutional, 
employment and family law), domestic violence, prostitution or “sex work” and rape 
in torts or criminal law, reproductive rights in health law, constitutional law, torts 
and contracts (e.g., surrogacy and adoption contracts) and as parts of larger 
advanced and elective courses (intellectual property, gender difference in dispute 
resolution179 immigration law,  human and civil rights). In a few schools with 
empirical or socio-legal research agendas new generations of scholars pursue 
important empirical projects on how gender is experienced, policed and regulated 
in a variety of legal settings.180 Like earlier generations, many here are looking at 
the role of the “rule of law” and the State and its institutions more generally as both 
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facilitating and claiming to promote equality, and also hindering substantive justice 
with rigid categories, disparate enforcement, benefits, punishments and treatments, 
and through co-opted reinterpretations of advocacy categories, when controlled by 
the state or disputed by different political interpretations.181 
 And, as many queer, post-modern and critical race theorists deconstruct (and 
reconstruct) more complex identities in the law, many scholars have come to 
question what they call the artificial “binary” of either biological sex or sociological 
“gender.”182  Thus, feminist theory, teaching and advocacy has “deconstructed” into 
more complex, less essential, categories and more “context specific” or 
particularized subjects of study. 
 At the same time a few in the older generations continue to pursue theories 
and issues that build on earlier conceptualizations, such as continuing gender 
(essentialist?) specific projects, such as the important efforts to have rape formally 
recognized as an international war crime, the role of women in transitional justice 
and peace seeking activities, and the recognition of women’s rights as international 
human rights.183  Throughout the decades Professor Martha Fineman has held 
yearly scholarly conferences (and published books almost annually) to study gender 
issues but to broaden, deepen and “universalize” feminist interests into concerns 
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about subordination and vulnerability more generally, with emphases on children, 
abused people, gay, lesbian and transgender individuals, migrants, sex workers and 
other victims of oppression or discriminatory activity.  
 Whether we now inhabit a “post-feminist” world in which women legal 
academics now teach with a great variety of teaching methods, and pursue research 
and study of law reform in virtually every area of human endeavor, with an 
increasingly diverse student body, as well as the law professoriate, is one, perhaps 
overly “optimistic,” conclusion to be reached from the American experience. In my 
own view, the influx of women legal academics in the 1980s to the present remains 
significant not only for the demographic diversification of the professoriate, but 
more importantly, for the intellectual contributions of a variety of contested 
conceptualizations of how gender and law structure, constitute, and regulate all 
human activity. I still think that gender matters (whether from oppressive 
discrimination and stereotyping, or more socially constructed “differences”) and 
that different ideas about how gender matters in law will continue to provoke and 
inspire new legal “memes” (whether in formal doctrinal law, legal scholarship and 





Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954126
